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Abstract: This paper evaluates the global diffusion process for three ICT 
technologies: cellular telephony, Internet and personal computers to test the 
hypothesis that the difference between countries in institutional characteristics 
significantly affects the time to adoption of these technologies. The analysis 
shows that the quality of economic and financial institutions and, to a smaller 
degree political institutions, significantly affects the time to adoption of the 
studied ICT technologies. The institutional effects were not uniform during all 
stages of adoption and for all three technologies but the level effects were on 
average found to be of the same magnitude as those of education and GDP per 
capita. The results are robust also when controlled for a number of other 
possible determinants of productivity and growth as well as fixed country 
effects. 
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1. Introduction   
The introduction and diffusion of information and communication technology (ICT) 
infrastructure is often viewed as both an indication and a vehicle of economic success. Access 
to these technologies in a form suitable to the specific needs of a country is a prerequisite for 
participation in the global information society.  It has also been argued that ICT promote 
economic growth
1. But ICT is introduced at very different rates. In some countries mobile 
phones, Internet access, personal computers etc. were introduced more than two decades ago 
and have now a penetration between fifty and close to a hundred percent. In other countries 
they are even today available to a small elite only. A large share of these differences is 
explained by the level of economic development, but even across countries that are equally 
rich a number of other factors, institutional and organizational, must influence the time of 
introduction of ICT infrastructure in a country.  
 
This paper analyses the global diffusion process for three ICT technologies: cellular 
telephony, Internet and personal computers. The aim is to test the hypothesis that, in addition 
to differences in economical and educational attainments, there are specific institutional 
characteristics of countries that significantly affect the time lag until adoption of these 
technologies, thus adding to a technological divide.  
 
The detrimental effects of low quality institutions on the economic performance of countries 
have attracted the attention of a number of researchers
2. The focus has mainly been on three 
aspects of institutions, economic, financial and political institutions where economic 
institutions affect incentives, financial institutions affect access to capital and political 
institutions affect how many will benefit from the rules of the game. The assumption made in 
this paper is that lower incentives and financing for investment in new technology caused by 
bad economic and financial institutions as well as barriers and risks caused by restraining 
political institutions are some of the main causes of delays in investments.  This has a more 
general interest since the level of productivity in a country is to a large extent decided by the 
level of technology used in production so if bad institutions cause a delay in the adoption of 
                                                 
1 See for example Onliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). Even Solow has somewhat 
renounced his famous quote on the lack of impact of computers on productivity, Uchitel (2000).  
2 For example Acemoglu et al. (2001),(2004), Rodrik et al. (2002), Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine. (2003), 
Dollar and Kraay. (2003), Levine et al. (1999), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Claessens and Laeven (2003),  
Przeworski and Limongi (1993, Persson (2005), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004), Papaioannou and Siourounis 
(2004), Tavares and Wacziarg (2000)   3 
new productive technology, the aggregate result over time would be lower productivity. Since 
the level of productivity is one of the main determinants of growth
3 in a country this would 
also mean lower growth
4.   
 
To test the hypothesis of a causal relation between quality of institutions and time to adoption 
of the ICT technologies, proxies for the quality of economic, financial and political 
institutions are regressed on time to adoption of the three ICT technologies cellular telephony, 
Internet and personal computers. The corruption index from Transparency International and 
the IRIS3 composite index of property rights from International Country Risk Guide are used 
as proxies for quality of economic institutions. Private credit is used as proxy for financial 
institutions and the polity2 index from the Polity IV project is used as an index of the quality 
of political institutions. 
 
In this type of regressions one can suspect omitted variable bias. It is possible that factors not 
included in the regression cause both good institutions and quick adoption of new technology. 
To address this concern I use two different methods. First, since it is likely that a variable 
affecting both institutions and technology adoption should also affect growth significantly, 
obvious candidates for omitted variables in this regression are variables that have been found 
important for growth. Thus the variables found most important for growth in a number of 
earlier influential growth studies (Barro 1991, Barro 1996, Sala-i-Martin et al.  2000) are 
included in the regression to control for their impact. Second I control for country fixed 
effects.   
 
There is also the case of reverse causation. In growth regressions the problem is usually that 
one would expect countries with good institutions to have a higher level of economic income. 
On the other hand one should also expect that more developed countries should be able to 
afford better institutions. However it is not plausible that one single ICT technology should 
deeply impact the quality of institutions in a country. Also the use of data for quality of 
institutions from before the adoption of the new technology addresses this concern. 
 
The findings in this paper are that the quality of institutions significantly affects the time lag 
to adoption of the studied ICT technologies. The level effect is comparable to that of 
                                                 
3 Hall and Jones (1998), see also  Easterly and Levine (2001) for a further discussion and a number of references. 
4 Of course a test on three technologies can do no more than indicate the relevance of this link.   4 
education and GDP per capita and the results are robust when controlling for a number of 
other possible determinants of productivity and growth suggested in the growth literature as 
well as for country fixed effects.  However the institutional effect is not uniform neither in all 
stages of adoption nor during all stages of the lifecycle of the technology. Economic 
institutions have the greatest impact in the stage when an ICT technology changes from being 
used only by a small segment of early users to becoming a more mainstream technology used 
by a broader segment of the population
5. Financial institutions on the other hand matter most 
during the initial introduction of the technology in a country. Once a technology has acquired 
a user base external financing does not seem to be as important. Also financial institutions are 
most important for countries with an already low level of available credit while there are very 
small effects in countries where the quality of financial institutions has passed above a certain 
level. Except in the case of Internet adoption, political institutions play only a minor role and 
only in the initial stages of adoption (once the impact of economic and financial institutions as 
well as education and income are controlled for). In the case of Internet one suspects that the 
information sharing nature of this technology makes it special.  As the technologies mature 
the probability of a country adopting the ICT technologies increases regardless of the quality 
of institutions (or income and education) so that finally almost all countries have adopted the 
technologies at some level.  
 
Not only time to adoption is important for the availability of ICT technology but also the rate 
of adoption once the technology is introduced in a country. The results here show that the 
single most important factor in explaining the adoption rate is the time to adoption. The later a 
country starts the adoption process, the higher is the initial adoption rate, enabling late comers 
to make up for lost time by embracing the new technology faster. 
  
The nature and effect of barriers to technology adoption has been discussed in a number of 
papers. Parente and Prescott (1994)
 6 introduce a model where country specific costs for 
entrepreneurs contemplating investing in new technology form barriers to technology 
adoption which delays the investment. These barriers are assumed to take the form of 
“regulatory and legal constraints, bribes that must be paid, violence or threat of violence, 
outright sabotage, and worker strikes”. They then use the model to explain a number of 
“growth-miracles”. This paper adopts the underlying idea about barriers to technology 
                                                 
5 Popularly called “crossing the chasm” in the management literature. 
6 See also Caselli and Coleman II (2004)   5 
adoption causing delays in the introduction of new technology and explicitly tests the 
hypothesis that the barriers to a large extent are determined by the quality of institutions in a 
country. In the Parente and Prescott model the barriers diminish with the distance of the 
technology to the technology frontier. This is consistent with the empirical findings in this 
paper. Other determinants of barriers to technology adoption have been discussed. Parente 
and Prescott (1999)
 presents a model where monopoly rights increases barriers to technology 
adoption. Comin and Hobijn (2005) finds empirical support for a similar model where the 
lobbying interests of the monopolists work through different institutions. Comin and Hobijn 
(2003) also finds empirical support for the idea that the speed of technology adoption is 
affected by income, openness and human capital. They do not test the effect of quality of 
institutions, except for effective legislative power, since no measure of institutional quality is 
available for the time period chosen. Glaeser et al (2004) stresses the role of human and social 
capital as the important factors shaping both institutions and economic outcome in a country. 
Ciccone and Papaioannou (2005) find that human capital affects a country’s ability to adopt 
new technology. The effects of institutions presented here are robust when controlling for 
different measures of education.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data, section 3 
discusses the methods used, section 4 presents the results, section 5 addresses the concern of 
omitted variables, endogeneity and different robustness issues. Finally in section 6 some 
concluding remarks are given. 
2. Data  
2.1 ICT adoption 
The ICT technologies examined are the three I consider currently most important namely 
cellular telephony, Internet and personal computers respectively. The dataset used is data 
from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) which measures the number of users 
in the population for each technology since 1980 for approximately 200 countries. For these 
ICT technologies (and for a large number of other successful major technologies) it has not 
been a question of adopting or not adopting the new technology. The question has rather been 
when the technology would be adopted and at what rate. Figure 1 plots how the three ICT 
technologies have spread over the world. All three technologies have spread to almost every 
country on the globe during less than twenty-five years (in the case of Internet it took barely 
fifteen years for the technology to reach almost all countries on earth). But the diffusion rate   6 
has been very uneven. In Finland 0.1% of the population had a mobile subscription by 1980 
while it took fourteen more years for China and eighteen for India to reach this level. Bhutan, 
Afghanistan and Ethiopia reached the same penetration rate first by the year 2003. The 
dependent variable,  ICT Lag    { } PC Internet Cellular ICT , , Î , measures the delay for each country as the 
time to adoption for each of the ICT technologies. It is calculated as the number of years from 
the availability of the technology until the number of users in the population exceeds a certain 
threshold. The time of availability for a particular technology is calculated 
as ( ) ICT tion YearOfAdop min , the first year the number of users in any country in the data 
exceeds the threshold. The higher the threshold the higher the percentage of users needed for 
the technology to be counted as adopted and the later this number of users will be attained. 
Since the level chosen for the threshold will affect the values of ICT Lag , the threshold level 
will be varied from 0.1% to 20% to test the sensitivity of the results to this choice.  
 













































that have adopted the ICT technologies
Percent of world population living in countries
 
Source: Authors calculations’ using population data from  WDI and ICT adoption rate from ITU. 
Note:  Year of adoption calculated as the first  year > 0.1% of the population in a country are users. 
 
2.2 Quality of institutions 
 
ICT adoption is, not surprisingly, correlated with GDP per capita as this affects the ability of 
agents and firms to pay for the new technology. This is shown clearly in Figure 2, which plots   7 
GDP per capita versus time to adoption for a number of countries. However the dispersion is 
large: countries at similar stages of development vary widely in their time of adoption. For 
example Malaysia reached a penetration rate of 0.1% mobile users in 1987 while Algeria, 
with a similar GDP per capita in 1987, had to wait until 1999 to reach the same penetration 
rate. Other examples are Thailand, 1990, versus Syria and Cameroon (2000). In the case of 
Internet Portugal reached a penetration rate of 0.1% in 1991 while Saudi Arabia with a 
comparable GDP per capita in 1990 did not reach this penetration level until 1999. Bolivia 
(1996) versus Republic of Congo (2003) is another example. 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































Note:  Year of adoption calculated as the first year > 0.1% of the population has adopted the technology.  For 
PC the threshold is  > 5%  of the population due to missing data for many countries below that level. 
 
The hypothesis that I intend to test in this paper is that quality of institutions explains part of 
this variation but a test of this hypothesis requires measurements of the quality of institutions. 
The effect of economic, financial and political institutions on different aspects of a countries 
development has been extensively studied in the literature and a number of proxies for the 
quality of these institutions have been developed. I here make use of some of those.   8 
2.3 Economic institutions 
Economic theory suggests that economic institutions affect investment incentives. If on the 
one hand an agent investing in physical capital, education or improved technology expects to 
receive a large share of the profit from that investment, market forces will promote 
investments and these investments will lead to high growth. If, on the other hand, government 
interventions in the form of expropriation, corruption, distortionary taxes or other fees reduce 
profitability, both investments and growth will be low.  
 
To measure the quality of economic institutions I use two indexes that measure a country’s 
attractiveness for investments based on the quality of its economic institutions. One is a 
composite index for Government Anti-Diversion Policies (GADP) from International Country 
Risk Guide
7. It is based on a number of sub indexes compiled by a commercial firm targeting 
international investors and made available for academic use in a reduced form by Knack and 
Keefer
8.  The other is a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International
9. 
CPI is calculated as a composite index from a number of sub indexes. About half of these 
(2004 version) are based on the views of government officials and half on those of business 
leaders on the impact of corruption. Parts of the questionnaires to business leaders focus on 
the effect of corruption on the profitability of business both as regards business for domestic 
as well as foreign entrepreneurs and investors
10.  
 
The GADP and CPI indexes are highly correlated (0.89) and I use them in a complementary 
fashion. By being compiled over time by just one firm in a hopefully consistent process, 
GADP is suitable for a fixed effects regression using the within variation. Since it is available 
only up to 1997 when many countries had not yet adopted any of the ICT technologies at any 
significant level it is not suitable for looking at the effect of institutions on different adoption 
levels.  As soon as the breakpoint for adoption is set to more than a couple of percent, the 
level of censoring at 1998 becomes so high that one has to make a lot of assumptions on the 
distribution of adoption times to get significant results. ICT on the other hand, being created 
as the sum of a number of sub indexes where number as well as sources of sub indexes used 
varies over time and the final index is smoothed using lagged values, is not very suitable for 
                                                 
7 This index has been used as a proxy for institutional development by, among others, Hall & Jones (1998), 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Persson (2004) 
8 See Appendix or Knack and Keefer (1995) for some discussions on the index. 
9 This index has been used as a proxy for corruption by, among others, Persson & Tabelling (2003), Treisman 
(2000) , Wei (1997) 
10 See Lambsdorff (2004) for details.   9 
studying the within variation. On the other hand it is available up to 2004 for a large set (146) 
of countries and is thus used when studying the effect of economic institutions at different 
levels of adoption since there is less right censoring.   
 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Note:  Year of adoption calculated as the first  year > 0.1% of the population has adopted the technology.  For 
PC the threshold is  > 5% of  the population due to missing data for many countries below that level. 
AverageCPI is the average over available CPI data for the years 1980-2003. CPI index constructed so that a 
higher index represents better quality institutions. 
 
For cross-country regressions the average of the values available for the total time span 
studied (1980-2003) is used for each index (CPI average and GADP average). The average is 
used to increase the number of observations because data is not available for a number of 
countries during some of the first years of the period. Since institutions are considered to be 
very persistent over time the advantage of many observations outweighs the disadvantage of 
the increased risk of measurement errors. Both indexes give comparable results in the basic 
regression
11 but since CPI in my view more directly focuses on measuring the direct effects of 
economic institutions, only the results for CPI are shown. GADP is an index of risk to 
                                                 
11 Using GADP average in some cases results in somewhat lower effect and significance levels.   10 
investments, that is, if for example corruption has a low acceptance in a country the risk index 
for widespread corruption having a negative effect on the stability is larger than for the same 
corruption in a country that has a high tolerance for corruption (Lambsdorff 2004). The 
assumption here though is that it is the bad economic institutions, not the low tolerance for it, 
which is detrimental to investments. Figure 3 shows scatter plots of the relation between time 
to adoption of the ICT technologies and average CPI. The pattern is similar to that for GDP 
per capita and indicates a clear correlation but a large dispersion where countries with the 
same index vary in time to adoption. A higher index means better economic institutions which 
are correlated with shorter time to adoption, therefore a negative slope. 
 
2.4 Financial institutions 
 




























































































































































































































































































































Note:  Year of adoption calculated as the first year > 0.1% of the population has adopted the technology.  For 
PC the threshold is  > 5% of  the population due to missing data for many countries below that level. 
 
High appropriability of the returns to investments is not sufficient to enable an entrepreneur to 
introduce new technology or companies and individuals to demand it. Investments also   11 
require a well functioning financial system which reduces transaction, enforcement and 
information costs which in turn increases the savings rate as well as the capacity to invest and 
innovate (Levin 2003). Also improved information will enable capital to flow to the projects 
with most potential for success. At the other extreme imperfect capital markets may hamper 
investment, both the size of feasible investments as well as the choice to invest at all (Aghion 
et al. (2004), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) ).  Following Beck et al. (2000) the level of 
private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (PCF) is used as 
a measurement of the quality of the financial system in a market. PCF measures how financial 
intermediaries channels savings to investors (Beck et al. 2000). Figure 4 plots the relation 
between the availability of private credit and the time to adoption of the ICT technologies. 
There is a clear although less sharp correlation than in the case of GDP per capita and CPI. 
The dependent variable measures the number of users, mobile subscriptions, Internet 
subscriptions, PC:s, that is the demand for the service. In the case of PCF this is important 
since it could be argued that the suppliers, especially of mobile telephony and Internet access 
have the potential for attracting foreign capital. The local supply measured by PCF would 
then be irrelevant. The users, on the other hand, do not have this potential for accessing 
foreign capital. Mobile connectivity, Internet and PC:s are initially to a large extent demanded 
by firms using them as intermediate input in the production process or, in the case of Internet 
and PC:s, targeting them with content. If these local firms lack access to capital they can 
neither demand the new technologies nor create demand for them by supplying local content 
that makes the technologies more valuable to prospective adopters. 
2.5 Political institutions 
Political institutions affect the rules of the game as a result of either voter preferences or the 
preferences of the ruling fraction. The effect could be through for example taxation, patent 
regulation or trade regulations and tariffs. Different political institutions would assign 
different leverage to factions or groups within a country resulting in different policies on these 
issues. This in turn would affect the economic incentives for innovation and investment. The 
more “representative” the outcome of the political system, the more people will have the 
“correct” incentives for growth enhancing activities. Most of these effects would work 
through economic and financial institutions but some aspects, like personal freedom, could 
still directly affect the barriers to introducing new technology. To measure the political    12 
institutions in a country the POLITY2 index from the polity IV project is used. POLITY2 is a 
composite index measuring the degree of democratization versus autocracy in a country
12. 
The span is from –10 to 10 where the lower the value the more autarchy and the higher the 
more democracy in a country. Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of the relation between time to 
adoption of ICT technologies and POLITY2. Even though the linear correlation is not as 
pronounced as in the case of GDP per capita and CPI, there is a clear aggregation of countries 
in the upper left and lower right quadrant for cellular and Internet. For personal computers the 
relation is more unclear. There is an alternative index, Political Rights (PR) from freedom 
house that measures the extent of political freedom on a 7-grade scale. The correlation 













































































































































































































































































































                                                 
12 See Marshall and Jagger (2002) for a detailed description of the different components of the index.   13 
Note:  Year of adoption calculated as the year > 0.1% of the population has adopted the technology.  For PC 
the threshold is  > 5% of the population due to missing data for many countries below that level. POLITY2 is 
constructed so that increasing values indicates higher quality political institutions. 
 
2.6 Education and Income 
A common explanation of the delay in adoption of ICT technologies is that developing 
countries are poor and have a low level of education
13. Therefore the correlation between time 
to adoption and quality of institutions will be tested controlling for the effect of GDP per 
capita and level of education.  The primary measure of education used is the education index 
component of the Human Development Index from United Nations Development Program 
report. It measures a country’s relative achievement in both adult literacy and combined 
primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment. An index giving adult literacy a large weight 
is used since the level of utility gained from each technology, mobile telephony
14, Internet and 
personal computers is to a large extent depending on level of literacy. The results are robust to 
the use of the Barro-Lee indexes for average years of schooling as well as average years of 
secondary schooling.
 Since most technologies will at least initially not be local the GDP per 
capita measurement is in current US$ without any PPP adjustment. Investment costs and 
necessary profit levels are supposed not to depend on the local cost level. 
2.7 Data availability and multicollinearity 
ITU data on time to adoption is available for between 160 and 200 countries. In the year 2003, 
measurement of economic institutions was available for 145 countries while for financial and 
political institutions it was available for 105 and 152 countries respectively.  But for earlier 
years the data is not available for the full set of countries. When combining these different 
data sets in a panel suitable for duration analysis with time varying covariates there is a basic 
set of 82 countries where all variables are available
15. In the case of cross-country OLS 
regressions the quality of financial or political institutions in 2003 probably does not affect a 
decision to invest or not invest in technologies made available almost twenty-five years 
earlier. For this reason, and to minimize the risk of simultaneity bias, data from close to the 
time of first availability of the ICT technologies is used in the cross-country regressions 
which also affect the availability of data. The overlap between available data for OLS and the 
                                                 
13 See for example Ciccone and Papaioannou (2005) for an empirical paper on the importance of human capital 
for technology adoption. 
14 Ease of use, SMS, WAP services. 
15 This is calculated at a threshold level of 1% adopters. The higher the threshold the larger the possible country 
set. In some cases forward fill is used, see notes on respective tables. Country list in appendix.   14 
basic set of 82 countries is approximately 90% so to enable the use of the same dataset the 
remaining values are calculated using values from later years.  
 
Table  1 : Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Average CPI  145  4.17  2.17  1.07  9.44 
CPI  1316  5.02  2.58  0.00  10.00 
Average GADP  129  30.43  9.89  11.08  49.79 
GADP  1932  30.39  11.12  5.00  50.00 
Private Credit  3017  0.40  0.35  0.00  1.81 
POLITY2  3372  1.09  7.40  -10.00  10.00 
GDP/capitaa  3998  5.32  7.85  0.04  46.50 
Education  936  7.24  2.14  0.93  9.93 
Lag Cellular  199  1994.56  4.90  1980  2003 
Lag Internet  193  1996.48  3.08  1990  2003 
Lag PC  166  1993.63  4.46  1980  2003 
a 1000$ US  
Note: Summary statistics for the relevant variables 1980-2003. Lag Cellular, Internet and PC presented in 
calendar years for ease of interpretation. They indicate the year of adoption calculated as the first year >0.1% 
of population has adopted the technology. CPI and GADP constructed so that higher values mean higher quality 
economic institutions. POLITY2 negative values autocracy, positive values democracy. GADP available for 
1983-1997. CPI available for 1980-2003, up to 1994 on a five-year basis. Education available on a five-year 
basis up to 1999.  
 
The correlation between the regressors is high (see table 2 ), in the case of CPI and 
GDP/capita around 0.8.  
 
Table  2 : Correlations 
Variable  Average 
CPI 
CPI  GADP  Private 
Credit 
POLITY2  GDP/ 
capita 
Education  ln (Lag 
Cellular) 
ln (lag  
Internet) 
ln (lag  
PC) 
Average CPI  1.00                   
CPI  0.91  1.00                 
GADP  0.89  0.89  1.00               
Private Credit  0.66  0.67  0.66  1.00             
POLITY2  0.58  0.63  0.60  0.36  1.00           
GDP/capita  0.83  0.79  0.83  0.68  0.65  1.00         
Education  0.70  0.65  0.63  0.47  0.59  0.66  1.00       
ln(Lag Cellular)  -0.80  -0.69  -0.74  -0.50  -0.54  -0.76  -0.64  1.00     
ln(lag Internet)  -0.91  -0.82  -0.85  -0.65  -0.67  -0.82  -0.81  0.77  1.00   
ln(lag PC)  -0.45  -0.43  -0.47  -0.42  -0.39  -0.52  -0.55  0.38  0.54  1.00 
Note: Correlations between the relevant variables. Cross sectional data from 1985. ln Lag Cellular, Internet and 
PC calculated as the natural log of  the year >0.1% of population has adopted the technology minus the world 
wide inception year. CPI and GADP constructed so that higher values mean higher quality economic 
institutions. POLITY2 negative values autocracy, positive values democracy.  
   15 
3. Method 
3.1 Basic model 
The hypothesis to be tested is that quality of institutions affect time to adoption of ICT 
technologies. The data for institutions as well as income and to some extent education is 
available as panel data over time but time to adoption is by definition only available as cross 
country information. Given this limitation the simplest way to test the relation is in a cross-
country regression, which is done in the basic model. This makes use of only part of the 
available data as well as requires some limiting assumptions on parameters but makes for 
results that are easy to interpret. In the case of economic institutions there are no significant 
trends over time nor large variations in the data so to increase the number of measurements 
averages over time are used. For the other institutional indexes (as well as income and 
education levels) the values from the time of the inception of each technology are used. These 
indexes are regressed on time to ICT adoption, ( ICT Lag ). The following basic regression 
model is used: 
i i i i i i ICT u X POLITY PCF CPI Lag + × + × + × + × + = 4 3 2 1 0 2 ) ln( b b b b b { } PC Internet Cellular ICT , , Î  (1) 
 
X is a vector of control variables including GDP per capita and education as well as other 
variables discussed in section 5.1.  i is a country index. Time to adoption ( ICT Lag ) is entered 
as a log value to ensure that it cannot take a negative value.  
 
The way to calculate the value of the ICT Lag  has been to set it to the year the number of users 
in a country exceeds a certain percentage for the first time minus the year the technology was 
first commercialized. In regression (1) the percentage value used is 0.1% of the population. 
Since virtually all countries have reached a penetration rate of 0.1% for the three ICT 
technologies by 2003 (the last year of available data) there is no right censoring of the data 
and a simple cross-country OLS regression is feasible for estimating the basic model.  
 
Not only the time to adoption is important but also the adoption rate once the technology is 
adopted. To analyze the diffusion rate of the ICT technologies once they are introduced a 
second regression is used: 
i i ICTi i i i i u X Lag POLITY PCF CPI ICTGrowth + × + + × + × + × + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 2 b b b b b b
{ } PC Internet Cellular ICT , , Î           (2)   16 
ICTGrowth is calculated as the (average) change in adoption level during the first 5 years 









it it A A  where  it A  is the adoption level in country i at time t. For 
countries that adopted after 1998 the average over available data is used. This is regressed on 
the same institutional variables as in the previous regression but also the year of adoption is 
included in the regression. X is as before level of education and GDP per capita. Except for 
CPI the data is from the year of adoption. 
3.2 Duration Analysis  
The basic model only makes use of a cross-section of the data and requires the threshold for 
adoption to be as low as 0.1%. To provide additional evidence using the entire available panel 
of data as well as testing the effects of using different adoption thresholds a second model 
more suitable to handle the data, a duration model
16 is introduced. In this type of model the 
full panel of available institutional variables at each year until adoption of the technology in a 
country is taken into account. Also the adoption-threshold can be varied in steps from 1% to 
20% since duration analysis is much less sensitive to right censoring. The resulting 
coefficients measure the partial effect of changes in the covariates on the probability of 
adoption during a year conditional on not having adopted earlier. 
{ } it i it it it i Y Z A A A Z A ), ,....., , ( Pr 1 2 1 < ³ - -  where  it A  is the adoption rate for country i at time t, 
Z the adoption threshold used and  it Y  the covariates for country i at time t. The regression 
model is as follows: 
it it it it X POLITY PCF CPI
ICT iICT e t h t h
× + × + × + × + × =
4 3 2 1 0 2
0 ) ( ) (
b b b b b    { } PC Internet GSM ICT , , Î     (2) 
  ICT h0  is a probability of adopting the ICT technology (conditional on not having adopted it 
before) equal for all countries called the base line hazard. One could think of this as similar to 
the assumption of free dissemination of ideas. All countries know about the existence and 
advantages of ICT technology and everything else equal should have an equal interest and 
thus probability of adoption. The exponential term then represents how institutions and other 
country specific (X) barriers to adoption affect this probability (multiplicatively) resulting in 
the country specific probability  i t h ) (
17 of adoption. The coefficients are calculated on a 
                                                 
16 Duration analysis is commonly used in labour economics and to some extent in empirical work on technology 
diffusion. See for example Wooldridge (2002) ch. 20 or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) for a text book 
treatment of Duration Analysis and van den Berg (2001) p. 3384 for a number of references on applications of 
duration analysis in labour economics as well as other fields in economics. 
17 This probability is the hazard rate  ) (t h  which is the (limiting) probability that the event occurs in a given 
interval, conditional upon that it has not yet occurred, divided by the with of the interval.   17 
panel
18 using maximum likelihood, maximizing the probability of exactly the number of 
actual adoptions each year. This is done using the available data from the availability of the 
technology until 2003, the last year of available data, and takes into account the censored 
observations.  Information on time to adoption of the ICT technologies is available yearly 
while CPI and Education is available only on a five years basis for 1980-1994 (education up 
to 1999). To take maximum advantage of the yearly ICT data, approximated values are used 
for CPI and education in the intertwining years by simply forwarding values from previous 
years. Since especially CPI is very persistent over time and the model is not using within-
variation this is deemed acceptable. For the regressions Cox proportional hazard estimation is 
used. It is a method that estimates the effects of the covariates on the probability of adoption 
only relative to the unknown base line hazard but the advantage is that it is not necessary to 
make any assumptions on the distribution of ICT Lag .   
 
To gain additional information on the diffusion of ICT technology and it’s relation to 
institutions it is possible to estimate how the base line hazard evolves over time. If the base 
line hazard increases over time, positive duration dependency, the common probability of 
adopting a technology increases. In this case the implications would be that sooner or later, no 
matter how bad the state of the economy or institutions in a country, the probability of 
adoption for the country would become very high. This would then cause the adoption rate in 
the world to become close to a hundred percent. If on the other hand there is negative duration 
dependency there is the possibility of a fairly stable state
19 with two groups, adopters and non-
adopters.  The non-adopters would be those countries that has not yet adopted at a time when 
the base-line hazard sinks to a level that is so low that no matter how high is the income or 
quality of institutions in a country, they would still not adopt. To study which, if any, of these 
possibilities matches the data the behaviour of the base line hazard over time will also be 
analyzed.   
                                                                                                                                                          
) ( 1










> > D +
=
® D
 The coefficients shown are the exponentiated values so for a coefficient of for 
ex. 1.21, 1 step increase in the related index would mean a ~1.21 times (~21%) higher probability of adoption. 
Significance level is approximately the Wald test that 1.21 is different from 1. 
This model is directly related to regression model (1) which also could be written as 
i i u X
i ICT e Lag
+ =
b . When 
using OLS regression  (1) also requires the assumption on log-normal distribution of the errors which is not 
needed when using Cox PH estimated with maximum likelihood in duration analysis. 
18 The panel is unbalanced. Especially for early years data is missing for a number of countries.  
19 Of course, in the long run all countries would still adopt but for practical purposes the long run could be much 
longer than the life-span of the technology.   18 
4. Results 
For ease of exposition, in the basic cross-country regression I will first show the results for 
Cellular and then discuss Internet and personal computers at the end. Endogeneity issues are 
discussed in depth in chapter five.  
4.1 Basic results 
The basic results are based on cross-country OLS estimations. The time to adoption of mobile 
telephony is regressed on the quality of institutions, controlling for the impact of GDP per 
capita and level of education. The results are presented in table 3. In column 1 the quality of 
economic institutions, measured by average CPI, is regressed on time to adoption of cellular 
technology. The coefficient is significant with a negative sign which shows that higher values 
of CPI (better quality economic institutions) are significantly correlated with shorter time to 
adoption of cellular technology. This is not surprising given the scatter plot in figure 3. When 
the other two indexes of financial and political institutions are entered in column 5 and 6, the 
partial effect of average CPI is significant at the 1% level and there is only a marginal 
reduction of the coefficient. Very little of the relation between economic institutions and time 
to adoption of cellular can be explained by controlling for other institutional factors. However 
in column 7 when GDP per capita and level of education is included, the coefficient of CPI, 
though still significant at the 5% level, decreases to a third. 
 
Table 3:  Institutional effect on time to adoption of cellular technology. 
Variable  Cellular1  Cellular2  Cellular3  Cellular4  Cellular5  Cellular6  Cellular7 
AverageCPI  -0.354***        -0.296***  -0.286***  -0.124** 
  0.041        0.062  0.06  0.053 
POLITY2    -0.266***      -0.064***  -0.066***  0.004 
    0.043      0.022  0.022  0.021 
PrivateCredit      -0.325***  -0.600***  -0.043  -0.207**  -0.297*** 
      0.049  0.143  0.054  0.085  0.076 
PrivateCreditSq        0.089**    0.051*  0.103*** 
        0.039    0.027  0.028 
GDPcapita              -0.274*** 
              0.06 
Education              -0.044*** 
              0.016 
N  82  82  82  82  82  82  82 
r2_a  0.686  0.312  0.375  0.399  0.694  0.7  0.768 
Data: Basic country set of 82 countries. Values normalized by their standard deviation.  
Note:  The dependent variable Cellular is the log of time to adoption of cellular technology in a country 
calculated as the first year > 0.1% of the population has a subscription minus the inception year of cellular. 
AverageCPI is the average over available CPI data for the years 1980-2003. Other variables are cross-sectional 
data from 1985 except in 8.8% of the cases where values are extrapolated  using later year values. Robust 
standard errors included.   19 
Legend: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
That there are large dependencies between economic institutions, GDP per capita and level of 
education is documented in a number of influential studies. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2004) and 
Hall and Jones (1998) for example finds that quality of economic institutions proxied by, 
among other indexes GADP, affects growth while Chong and Calderon (2000) finds that there 
is also a significant effect from level of economic development to measurements of economic 
institutions. Glaesser et al (2004) on the other hand finds that level of education significantly 
affects the level of economic institutions. What can be seen here is that even when controlling 
for the effects of income and education, economic institutions are significantly correlated with 
time to adoption of cellular technology. That there is also a causal effect could be argued from 
the theoretical standpoint that adopting a technology at the 0.1% level, even an ICT 
technology, is not an event important enough to change something as persistent as institutions. 
The case that both time to ICT adoption and institutional quality could potentially be affected 
by some omitted variables is discussed in section 5. 
 
Financial institutions, proxied by private credit, are significantly correlated with time to 
adoption of cellular both when entered directly in column 3 and also when the square is 
included in column 4. The reason to include the square, allowing for a non-linear correlation, 
is that previous research (Aghion et al. 2003) indicates that the importance of financial 
institutions decreases with the quality of those institutions. The result here supports those 
findings. When all three institutional variables are included in column 5 and 6 only the non-
linear relation for private credit survives. Unlike the index for economic institutions the 
coefficients for private credit and private credit square changes only marginally when 
education and GDP per capita are included and they are still significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficients for private credit indicate that the partial effect on time to cellular adoption is 
quadratic and the maximum effect is attained inside the range of the data at less than one 
standard deviation above the mean value. Thus the quality of financial institutions is most 
important for countries with low to medium quality financial institutions but much less so for 
countries with high quality institutions
20. In the case of private credit the available data allows 
the use of data from before the introduction of cellular in most countries. Thus the results 
show that the quality of financial institutions from before the introduction of cellular is 
                                                 
20 This is well in line with Aghion et al. (2003) that finds that the increase in the positive effects of financial 
institutions on growth stops once a country has reached a certain level of financial intermediation (found to equal 
the level of Greece in their paper).   20 
significantly correlated with the future time of adoption of the technology, making it even 
more plausible that there is a causal relationship from financial institutions to time to adoption 
of the technology. 
  
In the case of political institutions, proxied by POLITY2, there is a significant correlation 
when only POLITY2 is entered (column 2). However once the other two institutional indexes 
as well as Education and GDP per capita are introduced in column 7 the level effects becomes 
very small and insignificant. If there is an effect of political institutions it is mainly indirect 
through economic and financial institutions
21 as well as through income and education. 
 
 I repeat the basic regression analysis using the other ICT technologies Internet and personal 
computers. Table 4, reports the results when all regressors (including controls) are included as 
in column 7 of table 3.  The general results are confirmed but there are individual variations. 
The most interesting is in column 5 where the partial effect of POLITY2 is significantly 
correlated with time to adoption of Internet even when adding all controls
22. What makes this 
ICT technology special is probably that one of the main targets of Internet technology is free 
information dissemination in a way that, at least previously
23, has been very hard to control 
for a central authority. 
 
Table 4:  Institutional effect on time to adoption of ICT technology. 
Variable  Cellular 
     1 
Internet 
      2 
PC 
  3 
AverageCPI  -0.124**  -0.061***  0.056 
  0.053  0.015  0.057 
PrivateCredit  -0.297***  -0.095***  -0.346*** 
  0.076  0.024  0.109 
PrivateCreditSq  0.103***  0.022***  0.082** 
  0.028  0.006  0.034 
POLITY2  0.004  -0.037***  -0.002 
  0.021  0.01  0.034 
GDPcapita  -0.274***  -0.059***  -0.173* 
  0.06  0.019  0.095 
Education  -0.044***  -0.046***  -0.128*** 
  0.016  0.011  0.034 
N  82  82  80 
r2  0.768  0.905  0.5 
                                                 
21 That there is an indirect link from different aspects of political institutions via economic and/or financial 
institutions affecting growth is suggested by Persson (2004), Feng Yi (2003) and Fidrmuc (2003). 
22 This result is robust also to the inclusion of a number of variables found to be significantly correlated to 
growth. See section 5.1. 
23 It is claimed that China (as well as some other regimes) are working quite successfully on a number of 
technical as well as organizational methods of addressing this issue. See for example 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/   21 
Data: Basic country set of 82 countries except for PC where there is no ITU information for Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. Values normalized by their standard deviation. 
Note:  The dependent variables Cellular, Internet and PC are the logs of time to adoption of respective 
technology in a country calculated as the first year > 0.1% of the population had adopted the technology minus 
the inception year of the technology. AverageCPI is the average over available CPI data for the years 1980-
2003. Other variables are cross-sectional data from 1985 for Cellular and PC and 1990 for Internet. 7.7% of the 
values are missing and are extrapolated using later year values. Robust standard errors included.  
Legend: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
In column 3 average CPI is not significantly correlated with time to adoption of personal 
computers. This is most probably an effect of deficiencies in the data set where very steep 
initial values for a large number of countries indicates that data collection was not efficient at 
low values of adoption. This effect disappears once the adoption threshold is increased above 
1% as is shown in the next chapter.  
 
The values of the independent variables are normalized by their standard deviation and the 
regression is log-normal. The coefficients in Table 4 can therefore be interpreted as the 
approximate partial percentage effect of a one standard deviation change in the independent 
variables on time to adoption. The level effects vary both between technologies and between 
the different institutional variables. The partial effect of a one standard deviation of CPI is 
largest in the case of cellular where it is also almost half that of GDP per capita and much 
larger than that of education. In the case of Internet the percentage effect is half that for 
cellular but larger than the effects of both GDP per capita and education.  For private credit 
the partial effect is larger than both GDP per capita and education for all three technologies. 
However due to the non-linear effects of private credit this is true only for low levels of 
private credit. At one standard deviation the effects are negligible. The coefficients for 
POLITY2 is significantly different from zero only in the case of Internet but here the level of 
the partial effect is comparable to that of all the other variables.  The overall conclusion is that 
the importance of quality of institutions for explaining time to adoption of ICT technologies 
are of the same magnitude as income and education.  
 
Table 5:  Effect of time to adoption on rate of adoption. 






CPIAverage  4.012  1.886  4.304** 
  2.586  1.137  1.929 
PrivateCredit  -3.068  0.062  4.194* 
  2.723  1.407  2.107 
PrivateCreditSq  0.606  0.313  -1.494** 
  0.648  0.331  0.714 
POLITY2  1.588  -1.072  0.391 
  1.109  0.954  0.645   22 
GDPcapita  -1.559  -0.276  7.215*** 
  1.741  0.965  2.43 
Education  3.307***  3.563***  1.233 
  0.898  1.21  0.796 
Lag Cellular  5.974***     
  1.947     
Lag Internet    2.920**   
    1.168   
Lag PC      4.037*** 
      1.259 
N  82  82  80 
r2  0.317  0.382  0.803 
Data: Basic country set of 82 countries except for PC where there is no ITU information for Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. Values normalized by their standard deviation. 
Note:  The dependent variables Diffusion  Cellular, Internet and PC are the average increases in the number of 









it it A A  .  AverageCPI is the 
average over available CPI data for the years 1980-2003. LagICT is the year of adoption. Other variables are 
cross-sectional data from the year of adoption for each country. Robust standard errors included.  
Legend: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
Not only time to adoption is important for access to new technology in a country but also the 
adoption rate once the technology is adopted matters. In the next regression the average 
increase in the number of adopters during the first five years is regressed on the different 
proxies for institutional quality as well as education and GDP per capita but also the time of 
adoption is included. The result, in Table 5, shows that the time of adoption is the single most 
important factor
24 in explaining the adoption rate. The later a country adopts an ICT 
technology, the faster is the adoption rate during the first five years. This means that late 
comers partly make up for lost time by embracing the new technologies faster. In the case of 
both cellular and Internet none of the institutional variables enter significantly in the 
regression nor does income. Only time to adoption and level of education matters. In the case 
of personal computers CPI, private credit and GDP per capita is equally important as time to 
adoption while education is insignificant. But in all cases time to adoption plays a significant 
role in explaining the rate of technology diffusion once the first barriers to technology 
adoption is breached. The more mature is the technology, the faster it spreads in a country. 
 
4.2 Duration analysis 
In the previous basic regressions a threshold of 0.1% users in the population is used for 
determining if a country has adopted a technology. The reason is to avoid right censoring thus 
enabling the use of OLS and a simple to interpret log-normal regression model. But adoption 
                                                 
24 Of the explanatory variables included of course. Since r2 is quite low there is also other explanations that 
matters.   23 
by 0.1% of the population could be very different from adoption by 10%-20% of the 
population. In most countries there is a small elite of fairly rich, educated and technology 
savvy people where the type of barriers to technology adoption might be quite different from 
those affecting time to adoption for a broader part of the population. Since the main reason for 
studying the causes of those barriers is the assumed effect of improved technology on 
productivity and growth, it is important to understand if the previous results hold also when 
looking at time to adoption for large parts of the population that could have a substantial 
impact on productivity and growth. To further analyze the data using different values for the 
adoption breakpoints as well as the full panel of available data, an estimation according to 
model 3 is done using Cox Proportional Hazard and time-varying covariates (panel data). The 
results are shown in Table 6 where the effects of institutions on the probability of adopting 
ICT technology for breakpoints of 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% are presented.  
 
When looking at the partial effect of CPI on time to adoption the coefficients are significantly 
different from zero and has the correct coefficient (larger than 1) which show that the quality 
of institutions are related to time to adoption of all three ICT technologies also at higher 
adoption levels. The effects however are not uniform at all adoption levels. In the case of 
cellular and PC the level of the effect show an inverse U trend with a maximum at 10% in the 
case of cellular and 25% in the case of personal computers. The effect of economic 
institutions on adoption time is largest when taking the step from early adopters to a larger set 
of the population
25. In the case of Internet on the other hand the effect is fairly stable for the 
different adoption levels.  The reason could be that the introduction of Internet is more driven 
by demand from new companies using the Internet as their channel towards customers thus 
starting with no existing customer base. 
 
Private credit and private credit squared has the correct coefficient, higher than one for private 
credit and lower than one for private credit squared. It is only for the cellular technology 
though that the coefficients are significant for adoption thresholds higher than 5%
26. For the 
other two technologies the quality of financial institutions has a significant impact only in the 
initial stages of adoption.  Once the technology becomes more widespread, the importance of 
external financing diminishes.  
 
                                                 
25 What has popularly been called “crossing the chasm” in the management literature. 
26 Cellular technology requires extremely large investments in infra-structure to increase capacity and coverage 
which could be one explanation for the differences in the pattern of the effect of financial institutions.   24 
The effect of POLITY2 is somewhat similar to that of private credit. It is significantly 
different from zero for breakpoints of 1% for all three technologies albeit at a very low level. 
This indicates the possibility of a small direct effect of political institutions at the initial stages 
of technology adoption. Except in the case of cellular, once a technology has gained a 
beachhead in a country the political institutions does not seem to have any direct impact on 
the adoption anymore.  
 
Thus the quality of institutions does affect the time to adoption of all three ICT technologies 
but not in any common pattern. Each technology shows different sensitivity to all three 
institutional effects during different stages of the adoption process. The level and even the 
presence of any effect vary as more and more people adopt the technologies. An interesting 
observation is that education follows the same inverse U trend as CPI but with even higher 
coefficients at the 10% and 20% adoption levels for Internet and personal computers. The 
education index is to a large extent measuring adult literacy and the result probably reflects 
the dependency of both technologies on reading and writing skills for maximum utility (when 
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CPI  1.39*  2.21***  2.66***  1.81**  3.44***  2.27***  2.77***  2.76***  1.54*  2.25***  5.60***  4.39*** 
PrivateCredit  2.49***  2.26***  1.85**  2.61***  2.78***  2.05**  1.59  1.17  2.27**  1.27  1.87  1.94 
PrivateCreditSq  0.84***  0.85***  0.87**  0.83**  0.86**  0.88  0.93  0.97  0.86*  0.94  0.86*  0.85 
POLITY2  1.44***  1.65***  1.51**  1.46  1.59***  1.03  1.42  1.16  1.42*  1.63  1.98  0.62 
Education  2.08***  2.10***  3.63***  2.91**  3.13***  2.90***  11.32***  6.87***  2.56***  5.82***  3.49*  11.61*** 
GDPcapita  2.11**  1.92**  1.82**  2.35***  1.55**  2.11***  1.66**  1.56**  1.12  1.95**  1.96***  2.85*** 
N  743  953  1036  1105  487  668  725  762  628  880  1000  1106 
Nr of subjects  82  82  82  82  80  82  82  82  69  77  80  80 
Nr of adoptions  81  63  55  44  71  61  38  30  63  55  36  25 
Data: Basic panel of 82 countries except for PC where there is no ITU information for Belarus and Kazakhstan. Values normalized by their standard deviation. Since some 
values are missing for early years not all countries are included for low levels of the adoption threshold. 
Note: Cox proportional hazard regression of the institutional effect on the probability of adopting Cellular telephony, Internet and PC. Adoption calculated as the time period 
when more than 1%, 5%, 10% or 20% of the population had adopted the technology. Panel of available data 1980-2003. CPI and education available on 5 year basis 1980-
1994 (education 1998). Missing data substituted  using forward fill where possible. Exponentiated coefficients shown. 





















































































































Source: Authors calculations’. Data from regressions in table 6. 
Note: Estimation of the baseline hazard function from Cox proportional hazard regressions of institutional 
impact on cellular, Internet and personal computers. Adoption threshold used 0.1%. Time is analysis time in 
years. Smoothed. 
 
When using duration analysis the effect of institutions is calculated as an offset (relative 
hazard) from a base line hazard common to all (see model (2)). This base line hazard is the 
common probability of adopting a new technology and is plotted over time in figure6 for the 
three different ICT technologies. It has approximately the same form for all three 
technologies, increasing (positive duration dependency) until a maximum and then decreasing 
during the final years. This means that when a technology matures, the probability of adoption 
increases regardless of the quality of institutions as well as levels of income and education 
until finally all countries will adopt the technology
27. The reasons could be both external to 
                                                 
27 This observation fits well with the models of  Parente and Prescott (1994) and Caselli and Coleman II (2004) where barriers to technology 
adoption diminishes with the distance to the technology frontier.  
   27 
the technology like network effects and spreading knowledge of the technology as well as 
internal in the form of micro inventions lowering the barriers to adoption. 
 
 
Summing up the results the two methods used, OLS and Duration Analysis, shows that all 
three institutional aspects play a role in the time to adoption of the ICT technologies. The 
pattern of this impact though is different.  
·  Economic institutions are increasingly important up to an adoption level of 10% and 
then show signs of diminishing. For personal computers economic institutions are not 
important at all at low adoption levels. One could speculate that either the first 
computer adopters are not in business related areas and thus not as negatively affected 
by low quality institutions or that reporting of low levels of computer usage is not 
effective. 
·  Financial institutions are important for countries with a low level of financial 
development. Once a country has reached a more mature stage of financial 
development it does not seem to play any further role for time to technology adoption. 
Except in the case of cellular, financial institutions are only important in early stages 
of technology adoption when users are few. Once a certain user base is reached, 
external financing is not as important. 
·  Political institutions, except in the case of Internet, have only a small direct impact on 
time to adoption and mostly in the initial stage. For Internet the impact is larger but 
still only in the initial stage of adoption.28 
5. Robustness issues 
5.1 Simultaneity bias 
In growth regressions there is always a risk of simultaneity bias. Good institutions cause a 
high level of income but a good economy would also enable better institutions. Here the 
dependent variable is the time to adoption of a single technology not GDP per capita. The 
possibility that the adoption (at the 0.1%-20% level) of an ICT technology should influence 
factors as persistent as institutions to any significant degree is not in any way as plausible as 
the possibility that the state of the total economy should impact the quality of institutions. In 
the case of regression model (1) the institutional values (except in the case of CPI) from the 
years prior to adoption are used for the majority of countries. This should strengthen the case 
for a causal relation from quality of institutions to time to ICT adoption.   
5.2 Omitted variable bias 
A more serious problem is that some factors not accounted for in the regression might affect 
the ability of a country to adopt new technology at the same time as they affect the quality of 
institutions. This leads potentially to an omitted variable problem. Since it is reasonable to 
assume that such a variable would also affect the economic growth of a country, one way to 
control for this is to control for factors found significant for growth by other studies. Since it 
is impossible to make such an exercise exhaustive it more serves the purpose of making the 
overall argument more plausible. The variables used are those found important for growth in 
Barro (1991, 1996) and Sala-i-Martin et al.  (2000)
28. The problem with this approach is the 
low number of degrees of freedom left when including a large number of variables in the 
regression. Especially since a number of these variables are not available for all countries in 
the regression. The table 7 shows the results, first without controlling for growth variables, 
column 1, and then when adding the growth variables, column 2-4. In the case of cellular  all 
institutional indexes that are significant in the base regression in column one are significant 
(albeit at a lower level) when adding the different growth variables in column 2-4.  The 
coefficients are fairly stable at approximately the same level
29. 
 
                                                 
28 See the appendix and/or references for a list of the variables. 
29 The aim of these regressions is to make plausible that the main results are not driven by omitted variable bias. 
It is not a further exercise in data-mining. Some more in-depth information is added here just as background 
information. In table 6 for the Xavier data the r2 value increases significantly, an effect mainly caused by the 
addition of a variable for the percentage of protestants in the population and to a lesser degree the exchange rate 
distortions. This indicates that something measured by these variables explains time to adoption of cellular 




Table 7: Controlling for growth variables. 
Variable  Cellular 







AverageCPI  -0.068**  -0.046*  -0.072**  -0.048* 
  0.026  0.027  0.032  0.027 
PrivateCredit  -0.711***  -0.658**  -0.738**  -0.702** 
  0.261  0.307  0.321  0.271 
PrivateCreditSq  0.742***  0.700***  0.758**  0.527** 
  0.234  0.25  0.291  0.235 
POLITY2  0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.005 
  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.004 
Education  -0.036***  -0.011  -0.021  -0.025 
  0.011  0.017  0.021  0.017 
GDPcapita  -0.030***  -0.033***  -0.031***  -0.015 
  0.008  0.01  0.009  0.01 
N  83  72  73  77 
r2  0.772  0.789  0.784  0.833 
         
Variable  Internet  Internet  Internet  Internet 
AverageCPI  -0.036***  -0.032***  -0.033***  -0.030*** 
  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.007 
PrivateCredit  -0.141**  -0.130*  -0.144*  -0.186*** 
  0.066  0.074  0.075  0.062 
PrivateCreditSq  0.099*  0.087  0.090*  0.121** 
  0.05  0.054  0.052  0.046 
POLITY2  -0.005***  -0.004***  -0.005***  -0.004*** 
  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Education  -0.026***  -0.022***  -0.023***  -0.022*** 
  0.004  0.006  0.006  0.004 
GDPcapita  -0.006**  -0.006**  -0.005**  -0.004 
  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.003 
N  88  78  78  81 
r2  0.924  0.93  0.937  0.941 
         
Variable  PC  PC  PC  PC 
AverageCPI  0.02  -0.006  0.02  0.023 
  0.026  0.036  0.032  0.037 
PrivateCredit  -0.821**  -0.970**  -1.074**  -0.978** 
  0.326  0.442  0.457  0.406 
PrivateCreditSq  0.478*  0.601*  0.657*  0.760** 
  0.284  0.352  0.379  0.345 
POLITY2  -0.004  -0.004  -0.002  -0.001 
  0.005  0.006  0.006  0.006 
Education  -0.043*  -0.038  -0.054  -0.038 
  0.024  0.033  0.038  0.026 
GDPcapita  -0.019*  -0.021  -0.022  -0.037** 
  0.011  0.014  0.013  0.018 
N  80  71  70  74 
r2  0.481  0.563  0.489  0.539 
Note:  The dependent variable Cellular is the log of time to adoption of cellular technology in a country 
calculated as the first year > 0.1% of the population adopted the technology minus the inception year of the 
technology. AverageCPI is the average over available CPI data for the years 1980-2003. Other variables are 
cross-sectional data from 1985. Robust standard errors included. Column Barro1, Barro2, Xavier includes 
variables found significant for growth in Barro (1991), (1996), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2000). Coefficients not 
shown. 





In the case of Internet the results are similar except in the case of private credit that is barely 
significant when adding the Barro growth variables. The values of the coefficients for both 
private credit and private credit squared are still not changing making it quite plausible that 
the loss of 10 observations as well as 6 degrees of freedom is the main cause.  For personal 
computers the results are not significantly altered when controlling for the growth variables
30. 
The overall conclusion is that the previous results are robust to controlling for the different 
sets of growth variables. The results are not driven by any omitted variable bias caused by 
omitting any of the growth variables found in previous work. 
 
A variable potentially causing an omitted variable bias should be expected to work on a 
country level as well as to be fairly constant or trending over time. This enables a second way 
of testing if the results are driven by omitted variable bias. The inclusion of country fixed 
effects and time dummies should remove the impact of any unobserved effects but since the 
time to adoption ( ICT Lag ) is constant over time it is not possible to use in a fixed effect 
regression. If one assumes that adoption level is increasing over time which is the case in 
almost all countries, the level of adoption would be proportional to time of adoption and time 
varying. The log of this value is used in the following fixed effect regression: 
 
it i t
it it it it it ICT
u a d Capita GDP
Education POLITY PCF GADP A
+ + + ×




4 3 2 1 0
b
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 (4) 
 
The GADP index of economic institutions is used as proxy for economic institutions instead 
of CPI since being the result of an evaluation by one firm it is expected to reflect changes 
over time more consistently
31.  t d is time dummies and  i a country fixed effects
32.  
The coefficients for GADP and private credit in table 8 are significant at the one percent level 
and of the correct sign. Both the effects of economic as well as financial institutions are stable 
to controlling for country fixed effects. POLITY2 on the other hand has the wrong sign in the 
                                                 
30 See previous note. Here the inclusion of the Xavier data has the effect of increasing the r2 value. This result is 
not driven by any special variable but almost all included variables ad to the effect in a fairly equal fashion. 
31 All variables except Education is available yearly. Education is available on a five year basis and values  for 
the missing years are forwarded from the closest previously available value. This is deemed acceptable since the 
coefficient for education is not a focus here. 
32 The index used for economic institutions is GADP, which is available for a different set of countries than CPI 
used previously. The possible overlap with the set of 82 countries used earlier is a set of 76 countries. The results 
shown are from all available observations resulting in a set of approximately 100 countries. Restricting the set to 




case of Internet and PC and the results are highly significant. An improvement in political 
institutions seems to indicate a negative effect on the time to adoption of the ICT 
technologies.  
Table 8: Fixed effects regression. 
Variable  Cellular 
     1 
Internet 




     4 
Internet 
    5 
PC 
 6 
gadp  1.487***  2.453***  1.094***  1.371***  2.376***  1.157*** 
  0.371  0.557  0.404  0.373  0.568  0.411 
PrivateCredit  1.663**  3.052***  2.751***  1.753***  3.242***  2.803*** 
  0.646  1.016  0.744  0.648  1.003  0.748 
PrivateCreditSq  -0.346**  -0.369*  -0.507***  -0.347**  -0.379*  -0.504*** 
  0.145  0.204  0.165  0.146  0.203  0.166 
POLITY2  0.092  -1.264***  -1.018***       
  0.266  0.407  0.304       
l4POLITY2        1.347***  0.929**  -0.361 
        0.252  0.365  0.294 
GDPCapita  0.529  -10.211***  5.681***  1.182  -8.983***  6.052*** 
  1.073  2.131  1.08  1.063  2.119  1.087 
Education  -6.767***  -4.526*  -4.457***  -5.300***  -5.050**  -4.262*** 
  1.453  2.307  1.482  1.437  2.37  1.556 
N  1379  742  1377  1367  731  1365 
r2  0.759  0.807  0.723  0.763  0.806  0.718 
Note: Fixed effect regression of institutional effect on distance to technology frontier. Dependent variables 
Cellular, Internet and PC measured as current adoption. Panel of available data 1983-1997 restricted by 
availability of GADP. Education available on 5 year basis, forward fill used to fill gaps. .l4 POLITY2 lagged 4 
years using data from 1979-1993. Values normalized by standard deviation. 
Legend: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
The fixed effects regression assumes a direct and yearly effect between institutions and time 
to adoption of ICT technologies. In the case of GADP and private credit this assumption is 
plausible. GADP is an index compiled by different country experts. Their opinion is based on 
leading indicators available also to entrepreneurs active within the country. Thus a change in 
the index is based on a previous change in economic institutions apparent to economic actors 
and should already be discounted in their actions. Private credit measures the amount of credit 
currently available, which means that it is already in use by entrepreneurs. In the case of 
POLITY2 though, a more plausible scenario is that the effects are lagged and requires 
substantial time to take effect.  Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004) for example
33 studies the 
impact on growth of democratization
34 in a country and finds that the curve is j-shaped with 
the positive effects entering after approximately 3 years while the early effects are negative. 
                                                 
33 Also Pettersson (2004) and Persson (2005) find that the duration of democratization positively affects the 
growth effects. 




The results of the regression using a POLITY2 value lagged 4 years
35 are shown in table 8 
columns 4-6.  
 
The effect of POLITY2 now has the correct sign and is significantly different from zero in the 
case of cellular and Internet. In the case of PC the coefficient still has the wrong sign but is 
smaller and not significantly different from zero. The conclusion is that after a stabilizing 
period the long run effects of democratization are positive also when controlling for fixed 
country effects.  
 
As can be seen from figure 1 the diffusion rate of the three ICT technologies is very fast. In 
the time span of 15 to 25 years they have spread over almost the entire globe. To capture this 
rapid expansion, yearly data is used in the fixed effect regression, which also allows the 
capture of the effect of POLITY2. If 3 or 5
36 years averages are used POLITY2 is again 
negative and insignificant while the effect on GADP and private credit is mainly to decrease 
the level of significance while the levels of the coefficients are relatively stable. 
 
If the regressions are run without controlling for country effects, ( i a ) in (4) above, the 
coefficients for the effects of the institutional indexes are not statistically different at the 5 
percent level from those found when controlling for country fixed effects
37. It is thus very 
plausible that omitted country effects do not significantly affect the correlations found 
between institutional indexes and adoption rates in the different countries. Since time to 
adoption, the dependent variables in the main regressions, is calculated using these adoption 
rates this also indicates that those results are not driven by omitted country effects. 
6. Concluding discussion 
The quality of institutions matters for the adoption rate of ICT technologies at a level 
comparable to that of income and education. A substantial part of the “Digital divide” can 
thus be explained by the quality of institutions. But is the policy lesson here that improved 
institutions is a road to faster adoption of new technologies in developing countries? Certainly 
it is one lesson, but this does not really come as a surprise to most people interested in 
development questions. Another interesting possibility emanating from the data is that 
                                                 
35 Changing the lag ± 1 year does not significantly change these results. 
36 5 years average is not possible in the case of Internet. 
37 The only exception is lagged POLITY2 in the case of cellular when restricting the dataset to 76 countries (see 




different technologies appear to have different sensitivity to the quality of economic, financial 
and political institutions (as well as to the level of education and income) during different 
stages of the technology’s life cycle. Understanding what aspects of the design of a 
technology makes it more or less sensitive to the quality of institutions as well as to the level 
of income and education would enable technology and design choices that are more robust to 
these factors. Of course this would also require an understanding of the mechanisms that 
causes R&D departments to choose one or the other technical solution. Barriers to technology 
adoption caused by bad institutions (as well as the other factors) could then also be influenced 
with R&D policies as well as more proper technology choices.  
 
Two changes to the adoption process over time are worth mentioning. First, as could be seen 
from figure 6, the process exhibited positive duration dependency: the ceteris paribus 
probability of adoption increased over time. Secondly, the results in table 5 show that the later 
a country adopts an ICT technology, the higher is the adoption rate. Since time itself does not 
cause changes this indicates that something changes in the technology or the conditions for 
adoption or both making adoption more plausible the more mature is the technology. 
Understanding what these changes are other than the trivial effect of lower prices might 
enable the creation of technologies that are easier to adopt as well as understanding what 
conditions are most beneficial to adoption. 
 
This paper shows that for the three ICT technologies considered the quality of institutions 
temporarily influence technology adoption and thus is an important cause of the technological 
divide. If the results here were typical for technology adoption in general, inadequate 
institutions would affect aggregate growth through delayed productivity improvements.  This 
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8. Appendix 1  
Variables 
ICT Lag  
The source for the calculations is International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Yearbook 
of Statistics (Geneva),  
·  Cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants (ITU estimates) 
·  Internet users per 100 population (ITU estimates)  
·  Personal computers per 100 population (ITU estimates) 
 
Quality of Institutions 
·  Corruption index 
Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International.  The CPI is a composite 
index, making use of surveys of businesspeople and assessments by country analysts. 
The number of sources varies somewhat from year to year. 2004 there were data 
from18 surveys and 12 institutions used as a base for the index.  Yearly data from a 
large number of countries (145 in 2004) has been available since 1995. In earlier 
periods data is available only for a limited number of countries approximately as a 5 
year average. The weighing process of the index makes use of a smoothing process 
and different statistical methods to improve the properties of the index. For a complete 
description please see Lambsdorff (2004). 
·  GADP 
Annual values 1982-1997 of quality of governance indicators weighted into an index 
using equal weight average of indicators (Law and order, Bureaucratic quality, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, government repudiation of contracts) in International 
Country Risk Guide from Political Risk Service. The different indexes are described 
as follows: 
Excerpts from variable descriptions, International Country Risk Guide: 
 
1.  Corruption in Government 
Lower scores indicate, "high government officials are likely to demand special 
payments" and that "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower 
levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export 




2.  Rule of Law (named “Law and Order Tradition” in ICRG) 
This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing 
to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and 
adjudicate disputes." Higher scores indicate: "sound political institutions, a 
strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power." 
Lower scores indicate: "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal 
means to settle claims." Upon changes in government new leaders "may be less 
likely to accept the obligations of the previous regime." 
3.  Quality of the Bureaucracy 
High scores indicate "an established mechanism for recruitment and training," 
"autonomy from political pressure," and "strength and expertise to govern 
without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services" 
when governments change. 
4.  Risk of Repudiation of Contracts by Government 
“This indicator addresses the possibility that foreign businesses, contractors, and 
consultants face the risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a 
repudiation, postponement, or scaling down" due to "an income drop, budget 
cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in 
government economic and social priorities." Lower scores signify "a greater 
likelihood that a country will modify or repudiate a contract with a foreign 
business." 
5.  Risk of Expropriation of Private Investment 
This variables evaluates the risk "outright confiscation and forced 
nationalization" of property. Lower ratings "are given to countries where 
expropriation of private foreign investment is a likely event." 
 
·  Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
Annual values from 1980-2003. Data from the Levine-Loayza-Beck data set, World 





















Where F is credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the 
private sector (lines 22d + 42d IFS) Pe is end-of period consumer price index and Pa is 
the average consumer price index for the year. 
·  POLITY2 
From the Polity IV project characterizing political regime characteristics and 
transitions 1800-2002. The POLITY2 index is an index created by subtracting two 
other indexes, DEMOC- AUTOC. The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). DEMOC and AUTOC in turn are 
constructed by combining three other indexes: competitiveness of political participation, 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief 
executive. The basic data is the result of coding based on historical and contemporary 
sources by teams of coders cross checking their results according to well defined 




Gross domestic product at market prices (SNA68) US$, constant 2000 prices (World 
development Indicators). GDP is income per capita at the time of first availability of the 
technology,  ( ) ICT tion YearOfAdop min . Since most technologies will at least initially not be 
local the GDP is in current US$ without any PPP adjustment. Investment costs and necessary 
profit levels are supposed not to be dependent on the local cost level. 
 
Education  
This is the education index component of the Human Development Index from UNDP. The 
index measures a country’s relative achievement in both adult literacy and combined primary, 
secondary and tertiary gross enrolment. First, an index for adult literacy and one for combined 
gross enrolment are calculated. Then these two indices are combined to create the education 










The following is a list of the variables found most significantly correlated with growth in 
three influential papers, Barro (1991), Barro (1996) and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2000) 
Barro (1991) 
·  Initial human capital 
·  GDP per capita 
·  Fertility rates 
·  Physical investment to GDP 
·  Government consumption in GDP 
·  Political stability 
·  Market distortions 
 
Barro (1996) 
·  GDP 
·  Schooling 
·  Life expectancy 
·  Inflation 
·  Improvments in terms of trade 
·  Political freedom 
 
Sala-i-Martin et al (2000) 
Strongly and robustly related 
·  Level of income 
·  Fraction of GDP in Mining 
·  Sachs and Warner Openness 
·  Fraction of Confucians 
 
Robustly related 
·  Life expectancy 
·  Primary schooling enrolment rate 
·  Sub-Saharan dummies 
·  Fraction of protestants 
·  The fraction of primary exports in total exports 



















Countries in basic list. 
Angola    Ecuador  Korea. Rep.  Romania 
Argentina  Egypt. Arab Rep.  Madagascar  Senegal 
Armenia  El Salvador  Malawi    Singapore 
Australia  Ethiopia  Malaysia  South Africa 
Austria    Finland    Mali    Spain 
Bangladesh  France    Mexico    Sudan 
Belarus    Germany  Mongolia  Sweden 
Belgium    Ghana    Morocco  Switzerland 
Bolivia    Greece    Mozambique  Thailand 
Botswana  Guatemala  Namibia    Tunisia 
Brazil    Honduras  Netherlands  Turkey 
Bulgaria  Hungary  New Zealand  Uganda 
Burkina Faso  India    Nicaragua  Ukraine 
Cameroon  Indonesia  Nigeria    United Kingdom 
Canada    Ireland    Norway    United States 
Chile    Israel    Pakistan  Venezuela. RB 
China    Italy    Papua New Guinea  Vietnam 
Colombia  Japan    Philippines  Zambia 
Cote d'Ivoire  Jordan    Poland    Zimbabwe 
Czech Republic  Kazakhstan  Portugal   
Denmark  Kenya    Moldova   
 